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I. Introduction
Altruism or mutual “caring” among family members has been hypothesized to play an important
role in facilitating risk sharing, particularly in environments with less developed markets (Becker, 1991).
Indeed, recent studies have provided evidence that family-based income transfers do contribute to
consumption smoothing (Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1994). However, there is also evidence suggesting that within families idiosyncratic risk is not fully
insured (Altonji et al., 1992), and that the transfer of resources among family members in response to
income fluctuations does not conform fully to simple models of altruism (Cox, 1987; Altonji et al.,
1997).
A problem with existing empirical studies of altruism is that they do not model explicitly the
well-known constraints on insurance arrangements that altruism may not fully overcome, such as barriers
to information that give rise to moral hazard and the commitment problems that arise when individuals
cannot enter into binding contracts. The implications derived from the assumption of altruism in such
models thus may be misleading. Moreover, if, for example, costly state verification is the principal
problem in attaining perfect insurance, it may be that the family is prominent in risk sharing not because
of altruism but because of familial information advantages.
Recent work on self-enforcing contracts (Coate and Ravallion (1993),Thomas and Worrall
(1995)) has provided insight into the structure of constrained-efficient insurance contracts in the presence
of imperfect commitment. However, this work does not explore the interactions between commitment
problems and altruism in determining risk-sharing arrangements and fails to explain the pervasive fact
that transfers, in both high and low-income countries, frequently occur between family members. In a
world in which contracts are either self-enforcing or enforceable by a third party, there would seem to be
no particular reason for this to be the case: it seems likely that households other than those to which one
is related would in general be able to provide one with more complete risk sharing than would those to1Thomas and Worrall (1995) use an approach developed in the context of implicit labor contracts
(Thomas and Worrall (1988)) to examine the question of whether optimal implementable risk sharing
contracts are non-stationary. This question was raised by Coate and Ravallion (1993) who, building on
work by Foster (1988) and Kimball (1988), examined optimal stationary risk-sharing contracts. Ligon,
Worrall and Thomas (forthcoming) provide an empirical test of this model using one of the three data
sets employed in this paper. While their results support the imperfect commitment model relative to
perfect insurance and autarchy, their approach (in particular the fact that explicit information on transfers
by partners are not used) does not permit an assessment of the role of altruism as a commitment device. It
should also be noted that the Ligon, Worrall and Thomas (forthcoming) approach focuses on intra-village
risk sharing, and thus does not permit an assessment of inter-village risk sharing arrangements, which
play an important role as shown below.
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which one is connected through family ties if, for example, the incomes of non-kin are less correlated
than those of kin. In a world in which contracts are not enforceable, however, altruism may play an
important role. To the extent that households entering into a risk sharing arrangement care about each
others’ welfare we would expect that they will gain more from insurance than they would otherwise and
thus that the scope of risk-sharing contracts will be greater.
In this paper, we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among
altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding
commitments. We incorporate altruism into the recent model of risk sharing under imperfect
commitment of Thomas and Worrall (1995) to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and
commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in
interhousehold transfers.
1 We show that it is possible to implement the tests in terms of directly
measurable variables, only some of which have been used in prior studies assessing alternative income
smoothing mechanisms. In particular we show that how much past transfers affect current transfers - the
“transfer asset effect” - and how much of a contemporaneous income shock is shared by transfer partners
- the “income shock effect” - differ in specific ways by both whether the transfer partners are altruistic
and by partner income covariances in the presence of commitment problems. The tests are carried out
using three panel data sets from two countries of rural South Asia that provide detailed information on2Wolpin (1984), Paxson (1992), Behrman, Foster, and Rosenzweig, (1997), Udry (1994, 1996),
Rose (forthcoming) use various measures of income shocks to test for consumption smoothing behavior
and to assess the importance of particular smoothing mechanisms, including financial savings, asset
divestiture, and labor supply.
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transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks.
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In section II we characterize the optimal implementable risk sharing contract under imperfect
commitment and illustrate using model simulation how the degree of altruism among transfer partners
and the magnitude of their income correlation influence this contract. The model simulations show that
although sufficiently altruistic families with less than perfectly correlated incomes will optimally engage
in risk pooling arrangements, non-altruistic individuals will not engage in risk pooling when income
correlations are sufficiently positive. We also show that if transfers play an insurance role but do not
achieve full insurance then transfers will respond to both contemporary income shocks and to the history
of previous transfers, with the latter arising as a result of the inability of households to commit to make
first-best state-contingent transfers. Moreover, the history dependence of transfers and their degree of
responsiveness to income shocks depend on the degree of altruism. In particular, we demonstrate that i)
the existence of binding imperfect commitment constraints implies that households that have made net
transfers in previous periods are less likely to provide subsequent transfers, given the current state of the
world, than are households that have been net recipients of transfers, but ii) contemporaneous transfers
are less responsive to transfers in the past and more responsive to current income shocks, for given
partner income correlations, when partners are altruistically linked compared to when they are not.
In section III, we show that estimates of linear approximations to the transfer functions implied
by the model are capable of identifying the roles of imperfect commitment, altruism and income
covariances in determining transfer behavior. We also use the simulations to investigate the robustness of
the results to lack of symmetry among transfer partners and to assumptions about the relationships
between kinship, income correlation and information. The data from three rural panel surveys that are3Because income is exogenous in the model, we are assuming away problems of moral hazard.
Hoff (1997) formulates a model which shows how moral hazard limits the extent of insurance and makes
insurance arrangements vulnerable to wealth shocks. In that model, however, it is assumed that contracts
are enforceable and the share of income that is pooled is endogenously chosen by the median voter, but
responds to shocks with a lag. Hoff presents evidence that there is concern about moral hazard in some
low-income country contexts. However, incorporating moral hazard considerations into a model in which
contracts must be self-enforcing and there is nonstationarity, as here, would add considerable complexity.
Moreover, the empirical assessment of the additional role of moral hazard would require data on the
behavior of all transfer partners that are not available.
4 As noted by Coate and Ravallion (1993) and Thomas and Worrall (1995) the assumption that
households are infinitely lived is not as stringent as it would seem: the model incorporates the possibility
that the players believe that any insurance arrangement will, for reasons exogenous to the history of
states and transfers, fail with some positive probability (e.g., as a result of the death of one participant),
in each period. In this case, the failure probability is absorbed into the discount factor.
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used to estimate these functions, specific aspects of the empirical implementation and the empirical
results are presented in Section IV. The estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect
commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements, whether kin-based or not, but also
provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus
in increasing the gains from income pooling.
II. Theory and Simulations
To capture the basic elements of interhousehold interactions and yet keep the model structure as
simple as possible we assume that there are two households i=1,2. In every period t each household i
receives an income yi(st) where s is the state of nature in period t.
3 Income cannot be stored or saved
across periods. We allow for altruism between the households by assuming that household single-period
utility is separable in own and other household consumption. In particular, the utility functions for







where u() and v() are increasing and concave and γ<1 reflects the degree of altruism. Households are
infinitely lived, discount the future with discount factor δ, and are expected utility maximizers.
45On the other hand, if information among family members is generally superior to that among
non-kin, the threat of relegation to the limited risk-sharing state may be more credible, as the family
member whose transfer arrangement is discontinued will find it more difficult to find another altruistic
partner. We consider in section III the empirical implications of this potential informational advantage
for families in enforcing punishments.
6Note that in line 1 of equation 1 the transfer is positive, and in line 2 it is negative. Intuitively,
the better-off household will make a transfer to the worse-off household in the static Nash equilibrium
when he cares sufficiently about that household that he is better off doing so than he would be by
accepting the autarchic allocation.
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t s.t. u )(y1(s)&t)/v )(y2(s)%t)'γ if u )(y1(s))/v )(y2(s))<γ
t s.t. u )(y1(s)&t)/v )(y2(s)%t)'1/γ if u )(y1(s))/v )(y2(s))>1/γ
0o t h e r w i s e
(3)
Because of risk aversion when the incomes of the two households are not perfectly correlated the
households can, in principle, benefit through sharing of resources. It is assumed, however, that contracts
are not legally enforceable. As a consequence, enforcement of any contract must rely solely on the
potential consequences for the two parties of violating the contract. In particular, it is assumed that if
either of the households does not meet the terms of the contract then the households revert to a sequence
of static Nash equilibria (SSNE), which can be of two types: for sufficiently low levels of altruism the
households operate in autarchy, as in standard models of imperfect commitment, but at higher levels
some limited risk-sharing still obtains. This latter possibility means that while altruism may increase the
willingness of an individual to make a transfer to a partner when his income is relatively high, it may also
decrease the ability to penalize deviant behavior by reducing the credibility of the threat of autarchy.
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The task is to specify the set of contracts that can be supported. In general, a risk-sharing contract
in the context of this model can be characterized as a transfer function τ(ht) that dictates the (possibly
negative) transfer from household 1 to household 2 that should occur if the contract is in force in period t
after history ht , where the latter is defined as the sequence of states up to and including the state realized
in period t: ht ={ s 1,s2,...,st}. The transfer function for the static Nash equilibrium given state s is denoted
67Whenever γ>0, even the one-shot game (defined in (3)) can support some transfers. The
questions is how much better can the players do under a time-linked contract. The implementability
constraint is simply the statement that the latter contract must provide utility no less than under the one-
shot game.
8Thomas and Worrall (1995). Although the proof by Thomas and Worrall (1995) refers to the













Define U(ht) as the expected discounted utility gain from the risk-sharing contract relative to the SSNE
after history ht so that:
and let V(ht) denote the analogous expression for household 2. The assumption that the contract is
enforced through reversion to the SSNE implies that a given contract can be implemented only if the
expected discounted utility gain from the contract relative to the SSNE is non-negative, U(ht)$0a n d
V(ht)$0, for each history ht. We refer to these constraints subsequently as the implementability
constraints.
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The set of implementable contracts can be characterized by a history-dependent convex function
Ws(U) that describes the maximal (over all implementable contracts) expected discounted utility gain that
can accrue to household 2 in state s if household 1 receives a utility of U.
8 Further, the optimal contract
can be characterized in terms of the evolution of the ratio of marginal utility
over time, where -λ is the slope of the Pareto frontier. In particular for each state s there is a history
independent interval [λs
L,λs
U] corresponding to the set of implementable points on the Pareto efficient


















The optimal contract may thus be characterized as follows. Upon entering the contract, the two
households choose a desired distribution of expected utility gains given the current state (i.e., a point on
Ws(U)). The negative of the slope on the Pareto frontier at this point, λ(h0)= -Ws0’(U)) corresponds to a
ratio of marginal utilities that the households will attempt to implement subsequently. In subsequent
periods, the level of transfer is specified so that, given the incomes of the two households, the ratio of
single-period marginal utilities equals this prespecified λ as long as the distribution that results satisfies
the implementability constraints given the current state and assuming that the continuation payoffs (i.e.,
what the players expect to receive if the contract is maintained) are determined by the point on the
frontier Ws(U) that corresponds to the λ from the immediately preceding period. If one of the
implementability constraints is binding (i.e, the one for the household required to make a positive
transfer), however, both the current allocation of resources and the continuation payoffs are adjusted
together, with the adjustment being as small as possible in order to just relax the implementability
constraint. The resulting λ and thus the new ratio of single-period marginal utilities is then maintained
until a subsequent implementability constraint binds.
The relation between this contract and the first-best contract is straightforward. As is well known
(see, e.g., Townsend 1994), the first best risk-sharing contract involves equating the marginal utilities at
all points in time and in all states of the world. Thus, for example, in the case of iso-elastic utility
functions, the first-best contract will involve simply pooling income in every period and then dividing it
according to some fixed distribution rule. Given imperfect commitment and sufficient impatience,
however, in a state of the world in which one household does particularly well the better-off household9The fact that both the current and subsequent allocations of transfers are affected when an
implementability constraint binds implies that the optimal implementable contract devised by Thomas
and Worrall (1995) is an improvement upon the optimal stationary contract considered by Coate and
Ravallion (1993). In the latter case only current allocations of resources are altered to meet the
implementability constraint resulting in less perfect risk sharing.The difference can be substantial: in a
numerical simulation Thomas and Worrall (1995) found that for sufficiently low discount factors that the
optimal stationary contract resulted in no risk sharing, whereas the optimal non-stationary contract could
achieve most of the gain from full insurance.
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would have an incentive to renege on this first-best contract by withholding his transfer and accepting the
SSNE transfers in the future. The optimal implementable contract specified here removes this incentive
by allowing the distribution rule to be shifted in favor of the better-off household. Changes in the
distribution of resources, and thus the loss relative to the first-best arrangement, are kept to a minimum
by allowing both current and future distribution to be affected by the implementability constraints when
they bind.
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It is not possible except in cases with very limited state spaces to derive analytical solutions for
decision rules from the model. We thus explore the qualitative implications of combinations of different
degrees of altruism, imperfect commitment and income covariances using simulations. We show that
because of the nonstationarity character of the optimal implementable insurance contract for given
current incomes, a household that has recently received transfers is less likely to receive subsequent
transfers than a household that has recently provided transfers. Thus, except in the case that full risk-
sharing is implementable (in which case the implementability constraints are never binding), transfers
should behave like credit in the sense that the results of past behaviors (i.e., outstanding debt)
importantly affect current behaviors (current borrowing). We also show that altruism influences the
extent of commitment problems as manifested in optimal implementable insurance contracts. However,
while we show that altruism may facilitate risk sharing, it is still necessary to explain why there are risk-
sharing arrangements among non-kin, even in low-income environments that lack formal risk-sharing
institutions. An important reason is income covariance. We thus also consider the implications of10The discount factor is chosen so that the key features of the contract may be illustrated. For
more usual discount factors (e.g., δ=0.9) the optimal implementable contract achieves close to the first
best contract even in the absence of altruism. Our results, presented below, provide evidence consistent
with the properties of our simulated model for the low discount factor used here. While this is consistent
with the notion that rural households are impatient or, as noted, that they face a significant exogenous
risk of having the agreement terminated, it may also be attributed to other simplifications of the model.
For example, we make the extreme assumption that a deviant household must subsequently consume at
SSNE levels. We relax this assumption by allowing for a positive probability of nonenforcement below.
11Solutions for the value and transfer functions for each set of parameters were found by reducing
the problem, through appropriate substitution, to one of solving two non-linear equations in two
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covariance in incomes for the nature of risk-sharing arrangements. An additional implication is that
income covariances among non-kin contracting households are endogenously determined and possibly
related to whether family-based risk-sharing arrangements are feasible.
To carry out the simulations we assume that u() and v() are logrithmic and thus that the period
specific-utility for households 1 and 2 are ln(c1)+γln(c2)a n dl n ( c 2)+γln(c1), respectively. Incomes for
each household take on one of two values, 2 or 4, each with probability ½, with varying degrees of
correlation. To capture these differences in correlation we let the state s take on 4 values, 1, 2, 3, and 4
with y1( s )e q u a lt o2i fs = 1o rs = 3a n d4o t h e r w i s e .S i m i l a r l y ,w el e ty 2( s )e q u a l2i fs = 1o rs = 2a n d4
otherwise. Then, the case of independence corresponds to each state occurring with probability 1/4, the
case of a positive correlation of 0.5 can be represented by assuming states 1 and 4 occur with probability
3/8 and states 2 and 3 with probability 1/8, and the case of a negative correlation of -0.5 can be
represented by assuming states 1 and 4 occur with probability 1/8 and states 2 and 3 with probability 3/8.
In the simulations that are presented below the discount factor is set to 0.75
10 and the degree of altruism γ
is allowed to vary from 0 to 0.6. We focus on symmetric optimal implementable contracts, i.e., those for
which the households agree to have equal expected utility gains from the contract at the start. We
examine below how the results are altered when the partners are engaged in a non-symmetric
relationship.
The solutions to this problem may be characterized as follows.
11 Starting from period 0,unknowns. The solution to the latter were obtained numerically. Copies of the program used to carry out
the simulations are available from the authors on request.
10
households attempt to split the available income. As long as states 1 and 4 are realized no transfers will
take place. As soon as either state 2 or 3 is realized the household with the higher income transfers some
resources to that with the lower income. In, say, state 2, the transfer will be 1 if the implementability
constraint does not bind, but less than 1 otherwise. Subsequently, anytime state 2 is realized the same
transfer is made and if state 3 is realized the same transfer is made in the opposite direction. Whenever
states 1 or 4 are realized, (i) if states 2 and 3 permit complete risk sharing (a transfer of one) the transfer
will be zero; (ii) if states 2 and 3 permit only partial risk pooling then there will be a partial transfer in
the opposite direction as that dictated by the most recently realized of states 2 and 3. It is worth noting
that in this simple model with four states it is only in states 1 and 4 that history matters; in the other
states transfers are not affected by past realizations. Finally, under the one-shot Nash equilibrium
outcome, if incomes are equal or incomes are unequal and γ#1/2 then there are no transfers but if γ>1/2
and incomes are unequal then there is a transfer of (4γ-2)/(1+γ) from the high to the low-income partner.
The solutions can be characterized graphically in terms of two summary measures. The first
measure is the degree of risk sharing, as measured by the difference in consumption share received by 1
when state 1 [4,2] is realized and that received when state 4 is realized [2,4]. Under full risk sharing, the
consumption share will be the same in both periods, yielding a zero difference. In the absence of any risk
sharing, each partner will consume his own income, so the difference in consumption share is 1/3. Figure
1 shows that risk sharing is facilitated both by low levels of correlation and high degrees of altruism
between transfer-partners. At a zero level of altruism it is evident that some risk-sharing takes place
except in the case of positive income correlations, with a difference between consumption shares in the
two states of 0.22 and 0.32 for the negative- and zero- correlation cases, respectively. As altruism
increases, the degree of risk sharing increases so that there is less and less difference in the consumption12To the left of this peak the optimal implementable transfer given equal incomes is determined
by the maximum consumption share that 2 is willing to provide 1 under equal incomes, which is
increasing in the degree of altruism. To the right of the peak the optimal implementable transfer given
equal incomes is determined by the minimum consumption share that 1 is willing to accept when he has
higher income, which is decreasing in the degree of altruism. The peak occurs at the point where the
minimum consumption share partner 1 will accept in the state in which he has higher income is just equal
to the maximum consumption share for 1 that 2 will accept when they have equal incomes.
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share achieved by the individuals in states 2 and 3. At levels of altruism greater than 0.3 (0.41), full risk-
sharing is achieved under negative (zero) correlation. Interestingly, when altruism reaches 0.5 for the
positive-correlation case there are only limited additional gains in terms of risk-sharing from achieving
higher levels of altruism. This reflects the fact that at these higher levels of altruism the threat of
reverting to autarchy following a violation of the agreement is not credible.
The second summary measure characterizes the degree of history dependence. In particular,
Figure 2 presents the difference in consumption share for partner 1 given equal incomes in the current
period between the case in which 1 had higher income in the previous period (state 2) and the case in
which 1 had lower income in that period (state 3). When this measure is zero then there is no history
dependence in the model: optimal transfers depend only on the current incomes of the transfer partners.
Here the pattern is more complex. At high levels of altruism corresponding to those in which full
risk sharing is achieved (see Figure 1), there is no history dependence. There is also no history
dependence in circumstances in which no risk sharing takes place, that is given positive correlations and
for altruism below .18. The degree of history dependence initially rises at low levels of altruism and falls
at higher levels, with the peak occurring at a lower level of altruism for the negatively correlated case
than the positively correlated case.
12 Thus the degree of history dependence is positively related to the
degree of income correlation at high levels of altruism but negatively related to the degree of income
correlation for low levels of altruism.
Figure 3, summarizes the expected discounted utility gain of the optimal symmetric
implementable contract (normalized by 1+γ for ease of comparison) relative to that obtained under the13 By comparison, it may be shown that the optimal stationary risk-sharing contract (i.e., that
arising in the Coate and Ravallion (1993) model) given positively correlated incomes permits no risk
sharing until γ=.3, at which point the optimal non-stationary contract is already providing 75% of the
first-best surplus.
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SSNE. It shows clearly the value of altruism and negative income correlations in sustaining insurance
under imperfect commitment. First, for each level of correlation, the surplus generated by the optimal
implementable risk-sharing contract rises sharply with altruism and then levels off, a pattern conforms
with the measure of the degree of risk sharing presented in Figure 1. The surplus also declines when
altruism exceeds ½, reflecting the fact that autarchy is no longer a credible threat when the partners are
sufficiently altruistic. Second, the degree of correlation importantly affects the surplus generated by the
risk sharing contract, with uncorrelated and negatively correlated incomes yielding 2 and 3 times the
surplus available under positively correlated incomes, respectively, at high levels of altruism.
Interestingly the difference in the curves is roughly constant so that even at low levels of altruism the
advantages of negatively correlated incomes are significant. Third, as was evident from Figure 1 no risk-
pooling can be implemented under positively correlated incomes for low levels of altruism: the surplus
generated remains at zero until the altruism parameter reaches a value of γ=0.19.
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Given that altruism is likely to be greater among family than non-family members, Figure 3 has
implications for the relative value of inter and intra-family transfer arrangements and for the types of
non-kin household pairs participating in mutually-beneficial insurance arrangements. In the presence of
commitment problems, the family will play a primary role in the provision of insurance because greater
surplus is provided by family households for a given income correlation. However, because the number
of potential family partners is small, family-based insurance is likely to be insufficient. Households thus
will also make use of non-family partners, selecting from the set of potential non-family partners those
with which they have relatively low income correlations. As a consequence of this process of selection
and the fact that one has relatively limited scope for choosing the income covariance of one’s family14However, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) discuss how the choice of marital partners in rural
India reflect the consideration of income covariances. And the data from Pakistan that we examine below
suggests that not all kin-based transfer arrangements involve small distances between transfer partners.
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partners, non-family transfer partners are likely on average to have lower income correlations than will
family transfer partners.
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III. Estimating Transfer Functions in the Presence of Imperfect Commitment and Altruism
a. Symmetric transfer arrangements
While Figures 1-3 provide a detailed characterization of the structure of optimal transfer
arrangements and how this structure varies with altruism and income correlation among partners, they are
of limited value in providing directly testable implications that may be obtained from the limited transfer
data obtained from household surveys. For example, Figure 2 shows clearly that history matters in the
sense that past transfers affect current transfers net of contemporaneous income shocks, and that the
degree of history dependence is affected by the degree of altruism and income correlation. However, it is
also apparent from the model that an exact representation of the way that current shocks and history
affect current transfers requires a complete specification of the joint distribution of incomes faced by two
households. Even if such information were available, the analytic and computational burden associated
with specifying the exact theoretical relationship between past and current transfers would be prohibitive
for different degrees of altruism and income correlations.
We therefor employ an alternative approach which captures the essential features of the model
and accounts for the type of information typically available in household panel data in which we specify
i) an approximation to the transfer function for a household and ii) an estimation procedure. We use
observations drawn from the simulation model to determine how variations in income correlations and
altruism influence the estimates obtained by applying this procedure. Comparison of these estimates with
those obtained based on the same specifications and estimation procedure but applied to actual data thus
permits an assessment of the extent to which altruism among family members facilitates risk sharing due15We establish below that this summary measure of history, given the econometric approach
used, is reasonable in that the application of the estimation procedure to data simulated based on the








to problems of imperfect commitment.
The approximation to the transfer function is generated by solving equation (5) for τ in terms of
λ(ht), y1(st ), and y2(st) and linearizing. We then substitute for λ(ht) a convenient summary measure of
history, the sum of past transfers, which may be interpreted as the "stock of transfer assets".
15 Let τit
denote the net transfers out by household i at time t so that the transfer asset stock is
Then the approximate linear transfer function is
where y-it denotes the income of the household with which i is contracting to provide insurance. The
results in Figure 2 indicate that, if the approximation is reasonable, when transfers are significantly
affected by imperfect commitment α1<0--an increase in past transfers-out results in fewer transfers out in
the current period.
There are a number of problems with the estimation of equation (8) that must be addressed in
practice. Most importantly, neither, y-it, the income of the transaction partner, nor Tit, the complete
history up to time t of transfers, will in general be observed by the researcher. In order to deal with this
problem we assume that income yit is the sum of a fixed anticipated component and an unanticipated i.i.d.
component, , model the correlation between the transfer partners’ error terms as ε-it=ρεit+u-it and yit'¯ yi%εit
difference (8) over two consecutive periods to obtain15
where ∆ denotes a forward first difference and α4=α2 +α3ρ. This procedure removes the fixed parts of Tit
and yit from the estimation, requiring only that there be information on transfers in two periods.
Moreover, as long as partners’ incomes are imperfectly correlated, the sign of the coefficient on the own
shock α4 will correspond to the sign of α2(α3=-α2 in the symmetric case) and will be less positive the
stronger the income correlation.
There remains an estimation problem, however, even when the own shocks εit are observed
because the idiosyncratic part of the unobserved partner’s shock u-it will in general be correlated with the
contemporaneous transfer τit. In addition, any measurement error in transfers will result in a negative bias
in the α1 in (9). Thus one must use instruments as well as differences to estimate equation (8). A natural
set of instruments are period t and t-1 shocks which predict transfers and are, by assumption, independent
of u-it.
Figure 4 presents the coefficient estimates obtained using the approximation given by (9) of the
transfer asset effect (α1) for different values of altruism and for three levels of income correlations,
obtained from the observations generated from the simulation model. A comparison of this figure with
the underlying degree of history dependence in Figure 2 yields important similarities as well as
differences. Figure 4 clearly identifies the combinations of altruism and income correlation that yield no
history dependence as evident in Figure 2. However, the estimated asset effects in Figure 4 are
monotonic in altruism while those in Figure 2 are rising and then falling. The reason for this is
straightforward: the effect of transfer history on current transfers is influenced by the degree of history
dependence as illustrated in Figure 2, and the magnitudes of past transfers which as implied by Figure 1,
are increasing in altruism. Thus over the range in which both history dependence and the magnitude of
transfers is rising it is not obvious how the measured effect should be changing–Figure 4 shows, indeed,
that the measured effect changes little with the degree of altruism over the relevant range. A further
implication of this fact is that no transfer effect can be measured under circumstances in which there are16Under these circumstances IV estimation fails because the instruments (income shocks) have no
power given that the left-hand-side variable in the first-stage equation, initial period transfers, is always
zero.
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no transfers–thus no effect can be calculated for positive income correlations at levels of altruism in
which there was no risk pooling as evident in Figure 1.
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There are two important qualitative implications of these patterns. First, higher degrees of
altruism for given levels of income correlations are associated with less of a transfer-asset effect. Second,
while the transfer asset effect is increasing in income correlation at moderate levels of altruism, there is
no clear pattern at low levels. Thus family-based transfers should exhibit less of a transfer-asset effect
than non-family transfer asset controlling for income correlation and family-based transfers should be
less affected by transfer history for negative relative to positive income correlation; however, transfer
asset effects should not necessarily be related to the degree of correlation for non-family transfer
arrangements.
Figure 5 presents the estimate of α4 - the effect of the own shock on transfers out. This graph is
closely related to Figure 1: transfers are more responsive to the level of the shock the greater is the
degree of altruism, for a given income correlation, and the less is the income correlation, for a given level
of altruism. There is an added effect of income correlation, however, arising from the fact that α4=α2
+α3ρ. Even after full risk sharing is achieved, in which case the degree of correlation does not affect
consumption shares (Figure 1), there is a differential in the estimated effect of income and transfers for
different levels of correlation. In particular, higher positive correlations are associated with lower
estimates of the effect of own income and transfers.
Figures 1-5 thus indicate the following: 1) Family-based transfer arrangements are preferred to
non-family based arrangements for the same income correlation 2) The income correlation for non-family
transfer partners should be less than that for family members 3) Insurance relationships can be
constrained by commitment problems, as indicated by a negative dependence of current remittances on17
past transfer outflows, even for relatively high levels of altruism. 4) Family insurance transfers will
exhibit a weaker negative dependence on past transfers and a more positive relationship with own income
shocks than will non-family transfers, for the same partner income correlations. 5) For both family and
non-family partnerships, transfers out will be less positively correlated with income shocks the higher the
correlation of the incomes of the transfer partners. 6) For intermediate levels of altruism history
dependence will be greater when incomes are positively correlated than when they are negatively
correlated. However, as indicated in Figure 3, the effects of cumulative transfers for positively correlated
and independent income correlations cross at low levels of altruism. Thus, no such ranking can be
provided at low levels of altruism.
b. Asymmetric transfer arrangements
A potential shortcoming of the above theoretical framework model in terms of its ability to
provide testable predictions regarding the effects of transfer asset and income shocks on transfers by
level of altruism and income correlation is that attention has been limited to the consideration of
symmetric strategies among symmetric players. While evidence presented below suggests that there are
some environments for which the assumption of symmetry is quite reasonable, there are other settings in
which asymmetric transfers are in evidence.
There is reason to believe, however, that the central predictions derived above for the symmetric
case also apply in the asymmetric context. The basic notion is that under an asymmetric transfer
arrangement average transfers will be non-zero, but as long as there is some need for insurance on the
part of the transfer partners, variation in transfers around this average level will respond to relative levels
of income and be influenced by problems of imperfect commitment in much, if not entirely, the same
way as they are in a symmetric arrangement in which the average transfer is zero. Because our empirical
strategy involves differencing transfer equations across time for each household, any difference in
average transfers across time for a given household will be removed and thus will not substantially17It is possible to set up a model of optimal asymmetric transfers with symmetric transfer partners
but such a model would be uninteresting. Because of the need for continuation payoffs to be as high as
possible to ensure compliance when full insurance is not implementable, an optimal asymmetric transfer
arrangement with symmetric partners mimics an optimal symmetric arrangement as soon as a
commitment constraint binds for the first time. Therefore in the absence of data on the start date of
transfer arrangements, optimal asymmetric transfer arrangements with symmetric partners cannot be
distinguished from optimal symmetric transfer arrangements.
18The solution method is directly analogous to that used in the symmetric case. The only
distinction is that, given the absence of symmetry, one must examine more possible orderings of the
allocations at which commitment constraints bind for different states of the world (5 versus 2).
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influence coefficient estimates.
To establish that this intuition is correct we alter the symmetric transfer model by allowing
incomes for the first partner to be twice the levels assumed in the symmetric context.
17 In particular, we
a s s u m et h a tp a r t n e r1a c h i e v e sa ni n c o m eo f4i ns t a t e s1a n d3a n d8i ns t a t e s2a n d4 .W et h e ns o l v ef o r
the optimal asymmetric transfer arrangement.
18 In cases in which more than one asymmetric arrangement
is sustainable we select the one that is ex ante optimal from the perspective of the better-off household.
Figure 6 plots for each level of income correlation and level of altruism the fraction of periods in
which transfers flow from the richer to the poorer household. As a point of reference, we also plot this
figure for the symmetric case, in which case the fraction is ½, regardless of the degree of altruism or
income correlation. The figure shows that the model yields the desired results: transfer arrangements are
characterized by transfers that tend to flow in one direction. The figure also suggests that the relative
degree of asymmetry differs depending on the level of altruism and the direction of the income
correlation. In particular, asymmetric arrangements only arise at moderate levels of altruism or higher. At
low levels the richer household has no motivation to make positive transfers on average to the poor
household, but benefits from insurance by sending transfers in periods in which its income share is high
and receiving transfers when its income share is low just as is the case for symmetric arrangements. The
fact that the larger household always has at least as much income as the poor household plays little role.
Figure 6 also suggests that differences in the extent of asymmetric transfers reflect the fact that with19The primary anomalies relative to Figures 4 and 5 are that the shock effect continues to rise
after full insurance is achieved in the asymmetric case and that there is a small decline in the shock effect
for negative income correlations at the level of altruism (0.27) at which full insurance becomes
implementable. The difference arises because although there is always a unique optimal arrangement
under symmetry and under asymmetry for less than complete insurance, there is a continuum of optimal
arrangements under full insurance when asymmetric arrangements are considered. Because of the
assumption that the arrangement most favorable to the rich household will be chosen when multiple
optima arise, there is a discrete jump at the point in which full insurance is reached and the arrangement
continues to change (in favor of the rich household) as altruism increases and the range of possible
optimal asymmetric arrangements expands.
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sufficient altruism the poor household only makes net transfers out in the 3
rd state, when each household
has the same income, and the probability that this state is achieved is higher when incomes are negatively
correlated.
Figures 7 and 8 exhibit the coefficients for income shocks and transfer assets that are obtained
when the proposed estimation procedure is applied to data simulated according to the above asymmetric
model. The qualitative implications of these figures correspond for the most part to those implied by
Figures 5 and 4, respectively. In particular, higher altruism increases the shock effect and decreases the
magnitude of the transfer asset effect while higher income correlations decrease the shock effect. At low
levels of altruism, the effects of increases in income correlation on transfer assets is non-monotonic while
at moderate levels the largest-magnitude transfer asset effects are observed for positive income
correlations.
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c. Families, information and the nonenforcement of penalties
Although we have thus far emphasized the notion that differences in transfer arrangements
between family and non-family partners are distinguished largely because of the importance of altruism
in the former, there are other potentially important distinctions between these two types of arrangements.
One possibility is that information sharing among potential partners about past violations of transfer-
based insurance agreements is more complete among family partners. If this is indeed the case then the
SSNE penalties that importantly constrain behavior given imperfect commitment may be more credibly20
imposed in the context of family transfer arrangements than in that of non-family arrangements. We
believe, however, that information about contractual violations would be reasonably complete among
households located in the same village. Thus, distinctions in transfer behavior between kin and non-kin
transfer arrangements for partners located within villages will predominantly reflect the role of altruism.
For inter-village arrangements, however, the superior information among kin may also be manifested in
differences between of kin and non-kin transfers.
In order to assess how the ability of families to make more credible threats affect transfer
behavior in arrangements involving partners for which information barriers may be important, we
augmented the symmetric transfer model by assuming that, in the event of a deviation, the transgressor
only reverts to the SSNE with probability 1-q. We then constructed graphs that indicate how variation in
the nonenforcement probability q affects the level of the shock and transfer asset effects obtained using
the proposed fixed-effects instrumental variables estimation procedure. This amounts to multiplying by q,
for any given period t, the expected gain relative to the SSNE of conforming to the arrangement starting
in period t+1.
Figures 9 and 10, which correspond to Figures 5 and 4 respectively, suggest that there are only
relatively minor qualitative differences between the roles of altruism and information as a means of
distinguishing between family and non-family arrangements involving partners not resident in the same
village. In particular, these figures show the effects of varying the nonenforcement probability q from 0
to 0.5 for the shock and transfer asset effects respectively, in the symmetric model with altruism set to
1/3. As might be expected the general effect of increasing the nonenforcement probability is to weaken
the extent of insurance. Figure 9 indicates that if family members have lower nonenforcement
probabilities, as seems plausible, then the difference in shock effects between family and non-family
transfer arrangements would be similar to that which would be expected if the family were primarily
distinguished by its level of altruism. In particular, as the nonenforcement probability increases, the21
effect of an income shock on transfers out decreases smoothly, reaching zero, at the point at which no
insurance is being provided. Not surprisingly, this point occurs at lower levels of q when the correlation
is higher and thus there is less scope for mutually beneficial insurance.
With regard to Figure 10, the increases in the nonenforcement probability leads initially to
increases in the magnitude of the transfer-asset effect for non-positive income correlations and
subsequently to small decreases in the magnitude. As was the case in Figure 4, the transfer asset effect is
not defined at levels of the nonenforcement probability for which no transfers take place. The fact that,
for example, transfer-asset effects are monotonically related to income correlations only at moderate
levels of altruism in Figure 4 corresponds roughly to the fact that the transfer-effect is monotically
related to income correlation only at low nonenforcement probabilities. Figures 9 and 10 thus suggest
that if it is believed that families share information more efficiently than do non-kin, it is necessary to
contrast family and non-family transfer arrangement within villages to identify the role of altruism, to the
extent that village-level information sharing is relatively complete. Moreover, to isolate the role of
income correlation from information considerations, it is useful to compare transfers between family
members separated by different distances.
IV. Data and Estimates
To examine the role of imperfect commitment in determining transfer behavior and to show how
this role is influenced by altruism while taking into account heterogeneity among households even using
the approximation function poses considerable demands on data: information is needed on transfers over
at least two consecutive comparable periods and on household and/or environmental characteristics that
permit estimation of income shocks. We use three data sets from South Asia that meet these criteria - the
Village Level Studies (VLS) survey of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics (ICRISAT), the Additional Rural Income Survey of the National Council of Applied Economic
Research (NCAER), and the International Food Policy research Institute (IFPRI) Pakistan Food Security20Transfers exclude gifts associated with weddings and any labor services but include all other
transfers in kind such as food or clothing.
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Survey. While these data sets are sufficiently comparable to permit the examination of the robustness of
our conclusions with regard to the existence of imperfect commitment in altruistic and non-altruistic
transfer relationships, only the ICRISAT data permit the full array of tests suggested by the model
because of the availability of partner as well as household information.
a. ICRISAT VLS Indian Data
The ICRISAT VLS data provide detailed time-series information on asset stocks and transfers for
farm households over a period of up to 10 years.
20 Begun in the crop year 1975-6 in six villages in three
agroclimatic regions of the Indian semi-arid tropics and extended to a total of ten villages by the 1984
final round, the survey collected longitudinal information approximately every three weeks on all
transactions for 40 households (production, investment, sales, and purchases) in each village divided
equally among four land strata - landless, small landowning, medium landowning and large landowning.
In 1984, a retrospective questionnaire was administered to all households in the ten villages to obtain
information on additional family details including inheritances.
A key feature of the VLS data set is that it provides information on the characteristics of transfer
partners. In particular, information is available on the location (inside and outside of the village) and type
(family, money lender, shopkeeper, etc.) of each transfer partner for eight years in three of the villages
and for five years in two of the villages. Restricting attention to those periods and villages in which
partner-code information is available and reasonably complete, we are left with a sample of 207
households in 5 villages contributing a total of 969 annual observations. We divide transfers into four
categories based on the information on transfer partners - whether or not the transfer was from or to a
family member or friend and whether or not the transfer originated from or went to a partner residing
inside the village.21These households are included in the econometric analysis as long as there were two
consecutive years of transfer information.
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Transfer transactions are pervasive among the households in the ICRISAT villages. In all but 14
of the 969 household-year observations, each household was either receiving a transfer or providing one.
Transfers were not only frequent but appear to be relatively balanced for many households, consistent
with a high degree of symmetry among transfer partners. As seen in the simulations in Figure 6,
households in symmetric pairs should on average be transferring out half of the time. Moreover, if the
probability of transferring out each year is .5 and the income shocks are i.i.d., the standard deviation of
the mean fraction of out-transfers over the eight-year sample period should be .177 and that for the five-
year period should be .224.
Table 1 provides the empirical means and standard deviations of the fraction of households in
each of the four ICRISAT VLS land class strata for each of the five villages who were on net transferring
out over the relevant eight- and five-year sample periods. The table includes statistics only for those
households with complete information over the sample period, excluding those households who were
dropped from the sample before the end of the survey and those households included after the start of the
survey as replacements.
21 As can be seen, for this balanced sample in all villages but one the overall
mean proportion of net out-transfers is close to (and not statistically significantly different from) the
theoretical value for symmetric arrangements of .5, with the standard deviations only slightly higher than
those predicted from both partner symmetry and independence. Moreover, a chi-square test applied to the
middle two land classes (small and medium) indicates non-rejection of the hypothesis that the fractions
are the same for both of these land classes (χ
2(1)=.677). The same test rejects the hypothesis that all land
classes are equally symmetric as the middle two land classes, however (χ
2(3)=32.0), and indeed, the table
suggests that the landless households are on average net recipients of transfers every year while the
largest landowners are net providers of financial support.22However, our first-difference estimation procedure eliminates any permanent component of
transfers, and the simulation-based estimates in Figure 7 suggest that the estimates of the transfer
function based on our estimation strategy are robust to permanent imbalances among transfer partners.
We additionally assess the robustness of the estimates to the presence of asymmetry in partner
transactions by estimating the transfer function using data from Pakistan villages, all of which are
characterized by strong net inflows of transfers, principally from family members residing in foreign
countries, reported below.
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Table 2 provides the average amounts of gross in- and out-transfers, mean profits and average
assets, by asset type, for each of the ICRISAT villages. Consistent with the patterns for the incidence of
transfers in Table 1, for all villages but one, Rampura, the average amounts of in-transfers balance those
for transfers out. In Rampura, the average level of transfers out dominate. The profit and asset figures
also suggest that the households in that village are also substantially wealthier than those in the other four
villages - mean values of financial assets and farm equipment are twice those in the other four villages,
debt is less than one-fifth and the value of livestock is more than threefold. There clearly is a persistent
redistributive component to inter-village transfers exhibited in Rampura.
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The average amounts of gross and net transfers and the three-year incidence of transfers by
partner type - family or non-family - and by location - whether or not the partners were located inside or
outside the village - are presented in Table 3. These figures suggest that there is overall symmetry within
each partner-type, with non-family, within-village transfers the most prevalent and non-family, external
village gross transfers the second-most prevalent and the highest in magnitude.
b. Empirical implementation using the ICRISAT data
The estimation procedure we adopt follows the procedure discussed in Section III and
implemented using the simulated data. The model also assumes, however, that the consumption good is
perishable and income is i.i.d., while in fact farmers and their transfer partners hold assets that affect
income or accrue interest, these assets change over time, and changes in non-financial assets may interact23The model also assumes that there are no alternative means of consumption smoothing, in
particular that credit markets are non-existent. Only one of the villages in the ICRISAT VLS (Kanzara) is
proximate to a bank (Morduch 1991). Although there is evidence that the level and importance of
transfers is strongly affected by bank proximity (Behrman, Foster and Rosenzweig (1997)), we could not
reject the hypothesis that the transfer function was not significantly different in Kanzara than in the other
four ICRISAT villages in our sample (F(5, 863)=1.61) based on the aggregate transfer specification
discussed below (or for any of the disaggregated transfer functions).
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εijt'ΣδkAijkt(ωjt& ωj) (10)
with changes in financial assets such as financial savings and transfers.
23 To construct a household-
specific time-varying income measure that conforms more closely to the i.i.d. assumption, we used the
fixed-effects estimates from Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) of a normalized Generalized Leontief
profit function obtained from the same data to estimate a profit “shock”. An important feature of the
technology specification in the Rosenzweig-Binswanger study is the incorporation of household (farm)-
specific weather effects that vary by asset type. Our measure of the farm-specific shock for household i in
village j at time t is thus:
where δk is the estimated asset-specific coefficient from the profit function from Rosenzweig and
Binswanger, Aijkt is the share of the kth asset in household total wealth at time t, ωjt is the weather shock
in village j at time t measured by the deviation of the onset date of the monsoon from July 1, and ωj is
the average village-specific onset date over the whole survey period.
Because the estimated income shock contains measurement error, we use instruments that predict
τit to predict εijt. These include two major inherited asset variables (inherited irrigated and dry land), each
household’s inherited wet and dry land interacted with village and time dummies, and the lagged weather
measure (monsoon onset). The household’s initial state variables, indicated by their inherited assets,
combined with the past history of shocks should be reasonable predictors of a household’s current state
(asset) variables that also importantly affect the influence of weather events on profits in a setting in
which there are constraints on consumption smoothing and credit but should otherwise have no effect on24For evidence, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) and Udry (1996). Neither of these studies
include transfer assets among the state variables, although in the former study the theoretical framework
assumes that transfers play an insurance role.
25In preliminary analysis we included in each of the disaggregated specification all four of the
transfer asset types. We could not reject the hypothesis that the set of cross effects for the alternative
transfers had no statistically significant effect on each of the transfer types. The F-statistics (F(3, 865))
were 1.91, 2.45, 1.12, 0.20 for family transfers inside and outside the village and non-family transfers
inside and outside the village, respectively. This result suggests that the behavior of transfer partnerships
is independent and that the separability assumption of a model that devotes attention to one smoothing
mechanism is not overly strong.
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contemporaneous profits (given the i.i.d. assumption). This because a household’s initial asset position
affects its capacity to invest for any given income shock..
To take into account non-perishability, we estimate an augmented version of (8) which includes,
in addition to transfer assets, other asset stocks - the values of net financial savings, farm equipment,
animals, and financial debt. Note that like the change in the stock of transfer assets (i.e., ∆Tit=τti)t h e
change in asset stocks reflect decisions about the allocation of financial resources in response to income
shocks.
24 These changes need also to be treated as endogenous with respect to any unmeasured
components of the income shocks (i.e., u-it).
c. Estimates from the ICRISAT VLS data
We exploit the partner data in the India ICRISAT sample to examine the separate and
interdependent roles of altruism and income correlation in determining transfers by estimating the
transfer function for each of the four transfer types defined by relationship and location. For each partner
type, the “own” effect on current transfers of changes in transfer assets is estimated using only the
corresponding transfer history, e.g., estimates of equation (8) for family members outside the village
include only the effect of the stock of transfer assets attributable to family members outside of the
village.
25 For comparison to estimates from conventional data that do not provide such partner26We rejected the hypothesis that each of the wealth variables had the same effect on transfers in
all equations reported in Table 4.
27
information, we also report estimates of the transfer function that aggregates all types of transfers.
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Table 4 provides the instrumental-variables fixed effect estimates from two specifications of the
transfer function, one using the estimated profit shock derived from the Rosenzweig-Binswanger profit
function estimates and the other using actual profits, for both the aggregated transfer function and for the
partner-specific transfer functions. Table A in the appendix provides the estimates from the first-stage
equations predicting transfer assets by partner type, the other asset types, and the profit shock. As
reported in that table, in each first-stage equation the set of identifying instruments is statistically
significant at at least the .05 level. Comparison of the fixed effects estimates, which do not use
instruments, reported in appendix Table B, and the IV fixed effects estimates in the first five columns of
Table 4 indicate that, as expected, without taking into account the error correlation between transfer
assets and the change in transfers, the transfer asset effect is biased negatively, and measurement error in
the profit shock measure results in a bias to zero in the profit shock coefficients.
The set of estimates in the first column of Table 4 are consistent with transfers playing an
insurance role, as the profit shock has a positive effect on net transfers out, although the effect is not
estimated with precision. The coefficient on the transfer asset variable indicates the role of imperfect
commitment in constraining the behavior of interhousehold transfers, as current transfers are negatively
and significantly related to transfer assets. The aggregated estimates in column one mask important
differences related to partner distance (income correlation) and kinship, however, as seen in the next four
columns of Table 4 which distinguish transfers by whether or not they are between family members and
whether they take place solely within the village.
The pattern of estimates of the disaggregated transfer functions indicate that imperfect
commitment effects are important for both family and non-family partners, regardless of the location of27An alternative hypothesis is that the differences reflect different degrees of altruism for
different types of relatives. As shown in Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), family transfer partners who
reside outside the village are likely the daughters of the head or parents-in-law of the coresident head’s
sons. Non-coresident family members residing within the village, however, are likely to be brothers of
the of the head, given land inheritance practices (Foster (1990)). The results in columns two and three of
table 4 are thus consistent as well with stronger altruistic feelings for daughters than for siblings.
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the partners. In particular, for each type of transfer defined by the kinship and location of partners, an
increase in transfer assets attributable to that set of partners decreases transfers paid out to the respective
partners in the current period. Moreover, the differences in the magnitudes of the transfer asset effects
and of the effects of the income shock on transfers across the categories appear consistent with the basic
patterns that emerged from the limited commitment model simulations.
Consider first the relationship between partner income correlations and transfer asset and income
shock effects. The model indicated that for at least moderate levels of altruism, transfers should be more
responsive to shocks but less history-dependent the lower is the income correlation. The clearest
evidence of the effects of income correlation is the contrast in estimated transfer asset and shock effects
for family-based transfers that are within-village and that cross villages, the estimates in columns two and
three. These differences in estimated coefficients reflect principally differences in the income
correlations of the partners for the same degree of altruism and, roughly, the same extent of information
sharing, and are consistent with the imperfect commitment framework - the transfer asset effect is less
negative and the shock effect is greater for the cross-village compared with the within-village transfers.
The test statistic for the hypothesis that the two sets of coefficients are equal indicates rejection at the
.004 level (F(2, 3468)=5.51).
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Note that the model is ambiguous with respect to the relationship between income correlation
and transfer asset effects for transfers between partners for whom the level of altruism is low. And the
estimates of those effects for non-family partners, in columns four and five, while indicating less history
dependence for the transfers among non-altruistic partners separated by longer distances, are not29
significantly different (F(1, 3468)=2.13. The shock effects, however, are estimated with too little
precision to conclude that they differ by income correlation in accord with the framework.
The second clear test permitted by the data is of the influence of altruism on transfer behavior
based on the contrast, for given income correlation, between the estimates of the determinants of family
and non-family transfers. As noted, a comparison of family and non-family transfers that does not control
for income correlations can yield misleading results due to the fact that correlations between family and
non-family transfer partners are not likely to be the same on average. This problem may be addressed in
general by conditioning on location and in particular by focusing on within-village transfers (columns
two and four) as income correlations across partners within a village are likely to be more similar than
are income correlations across partners who reside in different villages and differences in information
sharing is minimized. The estimates indicate, in conformity with the imperfect commitment framework,
that altruism between partners reduces the commitment problem - the within-village family-based
transfers are less history dependent, by over 7%, and substantially more responsive to income shocks
than are the within-village non-family transfers. Again, these differences are statistically significant at the
.004 level (F(2, 3468)=5.61). Despite the likely higher level of heterogeneity in partner income
correlations, the differences in history dependency of and shock effects on transfers associated with
altruism are also exhibited by the estimated intervillage transfer functions in columns three and five, but
only the difference in the transfer asset effects is statistically significant (F(1,3468)=8.30).
Finally, to ascertain if the patterns of the estimated transfer assets effects by partner type and
location would be affected by the specification of the income variable we used actual profits, treated as
endogenous, in place of the estimated profit shock. These estimates, reported in columns six through ten
in Table 4 indicate that the pattern of transfer assets effects are not sensitive to at least this
respecification of the income variable - the ordering of the transfer asset coefficients across columns six
through ten is identical to that in columns two through four and the magnitude of the coefficients within28It is not possible to use the village-level shock data to estimate individual household shocks by
interacting the measures of village shocks with household assets, as is done for the Indian ICRISAT
survey households (see below), because of the absence of information on asset levels in the data. The
ARIS panel survey only provides flows of assets across crop years.
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partner type and location are similar.
d. NCAER Additional Rural Incomes Survey of India and the IFPRI Pakistan Food Security
Survey
To further examine the robustness of our results obtained from the ICRISAT VLS sample we
estimate transfer functions using the two other rural panel data sets from similar environments that
provide the requisite multi-period information on transfers. These two data sets provide an interesting
contrast because, although the households face similar environmental conditions, in one transfer
arrangements are clearly non-symmetric and involve partners who are family members separated by long
distances. The first of these, from the NCAER ARIS, provides longitudinal information on asset stocks
and flows and on net transfers for 4,118 households from a national probability sample of all Indian rural
households for the crop years 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71. The survey does not distinguish the
transfer recipients or donors by relationship or location or permit the construction of household-specific
income shocks. There is, however, village-level information on the experience of adverse weather
conditions as reported directly in the survey by a village informant.
28 T h eA R I Sd a t aw e r ea u g m e n t e d
with information from the NCAER 1981-82 Rural Economic and Demography Survey. This latter survey,
which reinterviewed approximately two-thirds of the households interviewed in 1970-71 (those in which
the household head had remained the same up through 1981), provides information on the assets
inherited by the household heads prior to the 1968 round of the ARIS survey. This information is used to
construct instruments, as we did for the ICRISAT data, to predict τit, that include the period t-1 adverse
shock and that shock interacted with the inheritance variables (wet and dry land, animals, and farm
equipment).29Details of the computation of the shock, including estimates of the normalized Generalized
Leontief profit function used to obtain the shocks, and the test establishing that the estimated shock is
unanticipated at the time of the planting state, are presented in Behrman, Foster and Rosenzweig (1997).
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The second of these panel data sets, the IFPRI the Pakistan Food Security Survey, provides
information in twelve rounds for a sample of 926 households residing in 52 villages in three major
wheat-growing provinces of Pakistan - Punjab, Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province - followed over
the period July 1986 through September 1989. Unlike the NCAER ARIS survey, this survey elicited
information on transfers received from and remitted to relatives but on no other types of transfers. Thus
transfers are solely between households with presumably some altruistic connection.
The Pakistan survey data also contains information on inherited land (wet and dry) and on
current production costs, inputs and outputs. This information was collected in sufficiently closely-
spaced rounds to identify specific crop stages (planting and harvesting) within each of two annual crop-
cycles (Rabi and Kharif) in four of the twelve rounds. The detailed nature of this information permits
estimation of a stage-specific conditional profit function. We use the residual from the estimated harvest-
stage conditional (Generalized Leontief) profit function estimated from these data in Behrman, Foster
and Rosenzweig (1997) as the measure of the shock component of income.
29 As in the ICRISAT analysis,
because this residual shock measure contains measurement error, it and transfer assets are predicted
using instruments, which include the inherited land variables and village, time and inherited-land
interactions as in the ICRISAT VLS analysis.
To restrict our sample to environments that conform most closely to the assumption that there are
no alternative mechanisms for smoothing consumption, we use only households from the NCAER ARIS
and the IFPRI Pakistan data sets that are located in villages more than five kilometers from a credit
institution, based on village-level infrastructure information provided in both data sets. The sample sizes
from which we obtain estimates are thus 2700 households for the NCAER data and 205 households for
the IFPRI data. Table 5 presents, for each of these two samples and, for comparison, for the ICRISAT30Differences between the data sets in levels are due in part to the different years in which the
data were collected. In particular, the NCAER values are in 1971 Indian rupees, those for ICRISAT in
1984 Indian rupees, while those for Pakistan are in 1988 Pakistan rupees. Taking into account exchange
rate differences and inflation rates would suggest that in real terms farm profits in the Pakistan survey are
only slightly higher than the Indian average in 1971 and higher than those in the ICRISAT VLS villages,
which are in a poor region of India.
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sample, comparable prevalence measures for transfers and the means and standard deviations of net
transfers and gross transfers among those with positive transfers and farm profits
30. The flow measures
indicate that transfers occur often in at least two of the samples and are large relative to agricultural
income when they occur. Both the NCAER national sample and the ICRISAT VLS data indicate that on
average net flows are small. In contrast, there is a large average net inflow from the Pakistan sample
households. This reflects the fact that a large proportion of the rural Pakistan households had relatives
residing and working in foreign countries, most likely in Middle Eastern countries, who were evidently
remitting payments back to the family. Indeed, the data indicate that 67.1% of all transfer inflows in the
Pakistan sample originated from outside Pakistan.
The Pakistan data thus clearly contain households characterized by persistent non-symmetric
transfer arrangements among family members separated by considerable distances. Given these
differences between the Indian and Pakistan survey households and the nature of the transfer information
provided in the two surveys, we would expect that, as long as the asymmetry of transfer arrangements
does not importantly affect the transfer function relationships, as our simulations have indicated, history
dependence would be less important in the transfers observed in the Pakistan sample, which are kin-
based and long-distance, compared with those in the Indian sample, which include both kin and non-kin
transfers and which on average are likely characterized by smaller inter-partner distances.
With respect to the share of households exhibiting transfer activity it is interesting that for the
ICRISAT sample all households reported some form of transfer in each consecutive 3-year period that
they appeared in the sample while less than 10% of the India NCAER households reported a non-zero net31Despite this apparent difference in the degree of coverage our results for the different samples
with regard to the effects of transfer assets on transfers are quite similar.
32The four asset variables are combined into one wealth variable. In both data sets we could not
reject the hypothesis that the effect of each of the four asset types on transfers was the same. The test
statistics are: F(3, 2693)=0.03 for the NCAER India sample and F(3, 170)=2.45 for the Pakistan sample.
33Hausman-Wu tests of the orthogonality of the regressors with the error term yielded the
following test statistics: F(2, 2694)=0.22 for the NCAER India sample and F(4, 170)=3.78 for the IFPRI
Pakistan sample.
34It is instructive to note that the fact that the transfer asset effect for the NCAER data is close to
-1 does not imply that the arrangement is a pure credit arrangement in the sense that repayment is state
independent given what was borrowed. To illustrate this point we applied our estimation procedure to
simulated data using the incomes and probabilities for the symmetric model with zero correlation but
assuming that the transfer data were generated according to a simple model of credit. In particular, it was
assumed that transfers could take the value -1, 0, or 1 and that if a household received a transfer in period
33
transfer during the three-year panel. This difference likely reflects at least in part the fact that the
NCAER survey information is based on an annually administered question on net transfers whereas the
other two surveys were collected over shorter periods and constructed from a series of questions about
gross flows.
31
e. Estimates from the NCAER India and IFPRI Pakistan Data
Table 6 presents estimates of the approximation to the transfer function for the India NCAER
and IFPRI Pakistan panels.
32 The estimates from both data sets indicate that, as among the ICRISAT VLS
households, transfers play an insurance role - the experience of positive profit or weather shocks leads to
greater remittances sent out. The estimates also demonstrate the role of imperfect commitment in
constraining the behavior of interhousehold transfers, even those that are family-based and presumably
altruistic as in the Pakistan sample.
33 In particular, the transfer-asset effect is strong and highly
significantly different from zero in both samples. While the shock coefficients are not comparable across
samples because of differing definitions, the transfer asset variables are comparably constructed. The
point estimates for this variable indicate that in the Indian sample each additional Rupee that has been
sent out in the past results in almost a one-for-one decline in additional transfers out,
34 given the currentt then it would have to repay that transfer in period t+1 and no additional transfers could take place until
period t+2. Under these circumstances the estimated transfer asset and income shocks coefficients were -
1.5 and .2 , respectively.
34
shock, while in the Pakistan sample transfers decline by only one-third of a Rupee for the same change in
transfer history. This lesser history dependence exhibited by transfers in the Pakistan sample, which is
restricted to family-based transfers, is consistent with the clearly more prominent role of altruism and
with the fact that the transfers received by the Pakistan households originate from partners with less
correlated incomes compared with those for the NCAER households because of the large fraction of
Pakistan family members who are located outside of the country. As suggested by our model, both the
lower partner income correlations and the higher proportion of family transfer partners (by survey
design) in the Pakistan sample lower the history dependence of transfers relative to that in the NCAER
India data.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the role played by altruism in determining the degree of
insurance provided by informal risk sharing arrangements in a setting in which households are unable to
enter into binding contracts. In particular, we used three panel data sets from rural South Asia to test a
proposition that has emerged from the theoretical literature examining the implications of imperfect
commitment for risk-sharing arrangements: if households cannot fully commit themselves to make state-
contingent payments that are consistent with full insurance then the optimal achievable insurance
contract is not a pure insurance contract but a form of credit contract in which the history of recent
transfers influences current transfers. Our results provide support for the notion that imperfect
commitment plays a significant role as a barrier to efficient response to risk. Despite the fact that in
theory altruism may lessen the extent of risk-sharing, the empirical evidence also indicates that the
commitment constraint is attenuated, but not eliminated, among altruistically-linked households. We are
thus able to provide new insight into the well-documented prominent role played by the family in the35
provision of insurance and more precise evidence of both altruistic behavior and the limitations of
insurance mechanisms.
It is important to note that in constructing and testing a specific model of transfers and how they
differ between family and non-family partners we have abstracted from a variety of other possible
conditions that may also importantly affect the nature of transfer arrangements in developing countries.
For example, it has been established in the context of labor markets that in the presence of repeated
moral hazard, optimal wage contracts exhibit history dependence (Rogerson,1985). It is possible that a
model of transfer arrangements incorporating imperfect information regarding household effort and in
which family partners can better monitor effort than non-family partners might yield similar predictions
to those obtained here. While it would be interesting to see if a model developed along those lines could
be distinguished empirically from one with imperfect commitment, such an effort is most likely to be
fruitful, in our view, if information is available on the behavior of all of the partners involved in transfer
arrangements, rather than just one as is the case for the data sets considered here.
The fact that commitment problems limit the ability of households to fully insure themselves
against idiosyncratic risk even among households with altruistic ties suggests that commitment problems
may play a significant role in other behaviors, particularly those related to the intertemporal transfer of
resources. For example, commitment issues may also play a role in childbearing and parental investment
in human capital in developing countries to the extent that children cannot commit to provide parents
with a secure source of support in old age. (e.g., Becker, 1991; Cigno, 2000). More generally,
commitment problems have also been cited as a significant issue in such diverse other arenas, where
altruism is less salient, as in informal credit markets (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998), markets for health
insurance (Coate, 1995), wage setting and labor contracts (Thomas and Worrall, 1988; Ritter and Taylor,
1994), and sovereign debt (Kletzer and Wright, 1990). Our findings from three low-income rural areas
suggest that commitment constraints may have real importance, but additional data are required if the full36
array of constraints on consumption smoothing are to be jointly considered.37
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ICRISAT Data: Fraction of Net Transfer-Out Households, by Village and Land Class







































































Number of years 8 8 8 5 5 34
Number of households 38 38 38 31 37 182
aStandard deviation in parentheses.Table 2
ICRISAT Data: Means and Standard Deviations of Transfers, Farm Profits and Assets,
by Village























































































N 235 272 230 114 118 969
aStandard deviation in parentheses. All values in 1994 Rs.Table 3






































Percent of Households With
Transfers for 3 Year Periods
by Partner
b
62.2 56.7 100 88.8
aStandard deviations in parenthesesTable 4































































































































































aAnalysis based on 207 households from 5 villages contributing 1178 total observations. All specifications include village x time
dummies (not shown). These control for contemporaneous variation in aggregate village conditions inclusive of wages, prices and
aggregate income shocks. Right-side variables other than village x time dummies are treated as endogenous. Instruments include initial
values of state variables, inherited assets, inherited assets interacted with village x time dummies, and lagged weather shocks.
bAbsolute values of aymptotic t-ratios in parentheses.
cProfit shock computed from weather x asset coefficients from the estimated conditional profit function in Rosenzweig and Binswanger
(1993) and annual weather and asset data. See text.Table 5
































Percent of Households With Transfers for
3 Year Periods by Partner
b
84.1 7.8 100.0








aStandard deviations in parentheses
bAverage transfers in and out and percent for NCAER sample are based on annual net transfers
while those for Pakistan and ICRISAT sample are based on gross transfers. Average transfers in and
out exlude zeros.Table 6
























aAnalysis for NCAER data based on 2700 households. Each household contributes three observations.
All right-side variables other than the profit shock are treated as endogenous. Instruments include
inheritance of land and other assets, adverse shock in initial period, and interactions of initial adverse
shock with inheritance variables.
bAnalysis for IFPRI data based on 205 households. Each household contributes two observations.
Specification also includes village x time dummies, food stocks, inventories, and values of household
labor endowments. The village x time dummies control for contemporaneous variation in wages and
prices. Right-side variables other than village x time dummies are treated as endogenous. Instruments
include initial crop-cycle state variables (other than the production shock), inherited assets, household
composition, land ownership and village x time x land inheritance interactions.
cAbsolute asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses.
dThe profit shock for NCAER data is a respondent-reported village-level indicator (0,1) of whether
crop output was not adversely affected by weather. Profit shock for IFPRI data is the residual from
conditional harvest-stage profit function estimates in Berhman, Foster and Rosenzweig (1997). See
text.
eWealth=net financial savings + value of farm equipment + value of animal stocks - net liabilities.Table A



































































































































































































































aAll specifications include village x time dummies and inherited assets interacted with village x time dummies and lagged weather variables
(not shown).
bAbsolute values of t-ratios in parentheses.
cExcludes village x time dummies, which are included in the second-stage.Table B































































































































































aAnalysis based on 207 households from 5 villages contributing 1178 total observations. All specifications include village x time
dummies (not shown). These control for contemporaneous variation in aggregate village conditions inclusive of wages, prices and
aggregate income shocks.
bAbsolute values of t-ratios in parentheses.
cProfit shock computed from weather x asset coefficients from the estimated conditional profit function in Rosenzweig and Binswanger
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Figure 2
History Dependence of Consumption Share
1
by Degree of Altruism and Income Correlation
1Equal-income state ([2,2] or [4,4]) consumption share state received by 1 when previous state was [4,2]
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Figure 4
Estimated Effects of Transfer Assets on Transfers from
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Estimated Effects of Income Shocks on Transfers from Simulated Data
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Figure 8
Estimated Effects of Transfer Assets on Transfers from Simulated Data with Asymmetric
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Estimated Effects of Income Shocks on Transfers from Simulated Data
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Figure 10
Estimated Effects of Transfer Assets on Transfers from Simulated Data,
by Nonenforcement Probability and Income Correlation